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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, : 
Plaintiff / Appellee : Case No. 20000071 -CA 
vs. : 
Priority No.2 
SEAN THOMPSON, : 
Defendant / Appellant 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2) (e)(1999). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the subsection of Utah Code Annotated 76-9-201, Telephone harassment, 
which appellant was convicted of is unconstitutional on its face and as applied ? A constitutional 
challenge to a statute presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Mohi, 
901 P.2d 991,(Utah 1995). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-9-201 
(1) A person is guilty of telephone harassment and subject to prosecution in 
the jurisdiction where the telephone call originated or was received if with 
intent to annoy, alarm another, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, harass, or 
frighten any person at the called number or recklessly creating a risk thereof, 
the person: 
1 
(a) makes a telephone call whether or not a conversation ensues; 
(b) makes repeated telephone calls, whether or not a conversation ensues, 
or after having been told not to call back, causes the telephone of 
another to ring repeatedly or continuously; 
(c) makes a telephone call and insults, taunts, or challenges the 
recipient of the telephone call or any person at the called 
number in a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly 
response; 
(d) makes a telephone call and uses any lewd or profane language 
or suggests any lewd or lascivious act; or 
(e) makes a telephone call and threatens to inflict injury, physical 
harm, or damage to any person or the property of any person. 
(2) Telephone harassment is a class B misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Annotated $ 76-9-20Uamended 2001) 
Provisions set forth in the addendum to the brief of appellee. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In the bench trial, the victim, Carolyn Thayer, testified that Sean Thompson called 
numerous times within a period of an hour. (Tr. at 7). Thayer testified that several times she told 
Thompson to stop calling and that he was scaring her. (Tr. at 8). The investigating officer, 
Officer Michael Bastian of the Provo Police Department, testified that while he was at Thayer's 
home investigating the telephone calls, Thompson called again. Officer Bastian answered the 
phone and spoke with Thompson. (Tr. at 13) Officer Bastian asked Thompson why he was 
calling. (Tr. at 14). Thompson replied with slurred speech that he wanted to know if Thayer 
loved him and he wanted to see his daughter. (Tr. at 14). Officer Bastian advised Thompson that 
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he needed to meet with him and he (Officer Bastian) would be responding to Thompson's 
apartment. (Tr. at 14). 
Officer Bastian made contact with Thompson at his home and could smell a strong odor 
of beer on Thompson. Thompson admitted to consuming beer. (Tr. at 14). Officer Bastian asked 
Thompson why he was calling so many times. Thompson stated that he was upset because he 
wanted to see his child. (Tr. at 15). 
Thompson testified that he received a phone call from Thayer, prior to him making any 
phone calls. (Tr. at 18). Thompson testified that Thayer said maybe she would just give up on 
life and quit living. (Tr. at 19). Thompson testified that he called Thayer numerous times because 
he was concerned for Thayer and his daughter. (Tr. at 19). Thompson testified that he did not call 
the police independently to tell them his concern for Thayer and his daughter. (Tr. at 24). 
Thayer testified the she could not remember when she called Thompson but testified that 
she called Thompson at some point in time to see if he wanted to come and see his daughter. (Tr. 
at 10, 27). Thayer testified that she has never been suicidal and never said to him that she was 
going to harm herself or their daughter. (Tr. at 27). Officer Bastian testified that Thompson stated 
to him that the reasons he called so frequently were to find out if Thayer still loved him and 
because he wanted to see his daughter. (Tr. at 29). Officer Bastian testified that Thompson made 
no mention of Thayer's health or mental state, when asked by Officer Bastian why he was calling 
her so frequently. (Tr. at 29, 30). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals declared that subsections (a) and (d) of former Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-9-201 are unconstitutionally overbroad in Provo City v. Whatcott, 2000 UT 
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App. 86,1jl 1, P. 3d 1113 . Sean Thompson's conduct falls squarely under the prohibitions of 
subsection (b) of Utah Code Annotated § 76-9-201. The language in subsection (b) of the statute 
has not been declared unconstitutional and remains unchanged in the amended section 76-9-201 
which deleted the unconstitutional language from the telephone harassment statute. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THOMPSON'S CONVICTION OF TELEPHONE HARASSMENT SHOULD 
STAND BECAUSE HIS CONDUCT WAS VIOLATIVE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE 
A. The subpart of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 that Thompson was found guilty of is not 
unconstitutional 
In Provo City v. Whatcott, 2000 UT App. 86, fl 1, P. 3d 1113, this court ruled that only 
subparts (a) and (d) of the then-existing Utah telephone harassment statute, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-9-201 were unconstitutional. 
It is well-settled law that "[i]f a portion of a statute might be saved by severing the part 
that is unconstitutional, such should be done, so long as severance does not destroy the purpose 
of the statute." Whatcott, 1 P.3d at 1116. 
In the Utah legislature's 2001 General Session, Senate Bill 141, amended Utah's 
telephone harassment statute Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 and deleted subparts (a) and (d) that 
had been found to be unconstitutional in Provo City v. Whatcott, 2000 UT App. 86, f 11, P. 3d 
1113. 
Thompson's conduct was found to be in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 (l)(b) 
which reads as follows: 
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(1) A person is guilty of telephone harassment and subject to prosecution 
in the jurisdiction where the telephone call originated or was received if 
with intent to annoy, alarm another, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, 
harass, or frighten any person at the called number or recklessly creating 
a risk thereof, the person: 
(b) makes repeated telephone calls, whether or not a conversation 
ensues, or after having been told not to call back, causes the 
telephone of another to ring repeatedly or continuously; 
This language was preserved in the amended Telephone harassment statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-9-20l(l)(a)(amended 2001) and now reads as follows: 
(1) a person is guilty of telephone harassment and subject to prosecution 
in the jurisdiction where the telephone call originated or was received if 
with intent to annoy, alarm, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, harass, or 
frighten another at the called number, the person: 
(a) makes repeated telephone calls, whether or not a conversation 
ensues, or after having been told not to call back, causes the 
telephone of another to ring repeatedly or continuously; 
Indeed, Judge Schofield, in finding the defendant guilty at trial said the following: 
[T]he evidence which I've heard I think established beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant made a large number of telephone calls. . . . That 
was clearly documented by the officer who is a neutral third-party, . . .(Tr. at 32). 
I'm also going to make a finding that the defendant acknowledges making 
the calls, that it was in the very late hours of the night, early hours of the 
morning. And that I think the evidence is clear and unrebutted that there was 
never any rebuttal to the claim by Ms. Thayer that she asked the defendant not to 
make additional calls and yet he continued to do so. (Tr. at 32). 
And I think the most telling evidence is that he never did say to the officer 
a reason that would, that may constitute justification which is a concern about 
the safety or welfare of his wife and child. (Tr. at 32). 
Finally, the defendant admits to having used both prescription medication and 
alcohol. The officer concluded that he had some effects of those. I think all 
of that says that the defendant is not the most credible of the witnesses 
here. (Tr. at 32, 33). 
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I give the greatest, greatest credence to the officer who is neutral from 
these parties and detached from the circumstance. And he said that the 
defendant conceded making the calls and that it was late at night. And I don't 
think there was any legitimate purpose. I think the only clear evidence is that 
there was an intent to annoy. Particularly after Ms. Thayer said don't call back, 
any subsequent calls had to have been made with the intent to annoy or 
alarm or threaten or harass. (Tr. 33). 
For those reasons Fm going to make a finding, Mr. Thompson, that you're 
guilty of the offense . . . telephone harassment. (Tr. 33). 
B. Overbreadth Doctrine 
This court has held that M[a] statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad unless it renders 
unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. Particularly where conduct 
and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be 
real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Salt 
Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259 (UT App. 1997). 
The overbreadth is not 'substantial' if, "despite some possibly impermissible application, 
the 'remainder of the statute . . . covers a whole range of easily identifiable and constitutionally 
proscribable . . . conduct. . . ." Brockettv. Spokane Arcaedes, Inc., All U.S. 491, 503-404 
(1985), quoting United States Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 580-81 
(1973). Furthermore, overbreadth challenges weaken in strength when the statute proscribes 
behavior other than pure speech. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), the Supreme 
Court discussed overbreadth challenges as follows: 
Facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of 
practice and . . . its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the 
otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from 
"pure speech" toward conduct and that conduct-even if expressive- falls within 
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the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in 
maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected 
conduct. Although, such law, if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech 
to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect - at best a 
prediction-cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and 
so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly 
within its power to proscribe. Broadrickv. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). 
The Texas Court of Appeals heard a case regarding the constitutionality of Texas's 
telephone harassment statute prohibiting the causing of another person's telephone to ring 
repeatedly. The Texas statute Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.07(a)(4), states the following: 
(a) a person commits an offense if, with intent to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, 
torment, or embarrass another, he: 
(4) causes the telephone of another to ring repeatedly or makes repeated telephone 
communications anonymously or in a manner reasonably likely to harass, annoy, 
alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend another;... 
The Texas Court of Appeals held that "a person who causes another person's telephone 
to ring repeatedly or repeatedly makes anonymous telephone calls to another person is not a 
constitutionally protected activity under the First Amendment." State Of Texas v. Johns, Lexis 
5539 (Tex. App. 1998) quoting DeWillis v. State, 951 S. W. 2d at 212 (Tex. App. Houston [14th 
Dist.] 1997). 
Utah's amended telephone harassment statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad, either 
as applied to Thompson or facially, because (1) the statute does not render unlawful 
constitutionally protected conduct. Thompson's conduct of repeatedly calling Thayer and 
continuing to do so after he was told to stop is not constitutionally protected activity. Thereby, 
the statute does not violate the First amendment to the Constitution of the United States or 
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Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution and (2) Thompson's conduct falls squarely under 
the prohibitions of the Utah telephone harassment statute. 
In Provo City v. WhatcotU 2000 UT App. 86, fl 1, P. 3d 1113, this court ruled that only 
subparts (a) and (d) of the then-existing Utah telephone harassment statute were unconstitutional. 
The language of subsection (b) of Utah Code Annotated § 76-9-201 remains unchanged in the 
amended section of 76-9-201. Sean Thompson's conduct falls squarely under the prohibitions of 
subsection (b) in that he intended to annoy or alarm or threaten or harass Thayer by making 
repeated phone calls and continued to do so when Thayer asked him to stop calling, as Judge 
Schofield ruled. 
C. Vagueness 
Thompson argues that, "the all encompassing language of the statute's specific intent 
provisions does not put one on adequate notice of when the content of a single call might be 
prohibited." (Appellant's Brief at 15). But what he did was to call multiple times, in violation of 
the statute with the intent prohibited by the statute. Indeed, as Judge Schofield ruled at trial 
. . .the only clear evidence is that there was an intent to annoy. Particularly after Ms. Thayer said 
don't call back, any subsequent calls had to have been made with the intent to annoy or alarm or 
threaten or harass. (Tr. 33). 
"The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a statute or ordinance define an offense 
with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in 
a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Salt Lake City v. 
Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah App. 1997). In the case of The People of the State of Colorado v. 
McBurney, 750 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1988), the Supreme Court explained that "a criminal statute need 
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not contain precise definitions of every word or phrase constituting an element of the offense. 
Also, due process considerations permit statutory language to be sufficiently general so as to be 
capable of flexible application to varied circumstances." McBurney, 750 P.2d at 920. 
A statute is not vague if it requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant acted with 
specific intent to annoy, alarm, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, harass, or frighten. The 
United States Supreme Court has held that the specific intent element also exposes the 
weaknesses of the vagueness allegation. In The People of the State of Colorado v. McBurney\ 
750 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1988) quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-102, (1945) the 
Court said: 
The Court, indeed, has recognized that the requirement of a specific intent 
to do a prohibited act may avoid those consequences to the accused which 
may otherwise render a vague or indefinite statute invalid . . . where the 
punishment imposed is only for an act knowingly done with the purpose 
of doing that which the statute prohibits, the accused cannot be said to 
suffer from lack of warning or knowledge that the act which he does is 
a violation of the law. 
Thompson cannot claim that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because a person of 
ordinary intelligence would not know what content would violate the statute. There does not 
have to be any content in order to violate the statute. There has to be specific intent to annoy, 
alarm, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, harass, or frighten another. Thompson was found 
guilty of intending to annoy or alarm or threaten or harass in making repeated phone calls, which 
the statute prohibits, as Judge Schofield ruled. 
The Utah telephone harassment statute specifically conveys to the public what specific 
anticipated action is prohibited. Therefore, persons of reasonable intelligence can conclude, 
without any vagueness, what message or behavior intended to annoy, or alarm, or intimidate, etc. 
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falls under the prohibited actions of Utah's telephone harassment statute. Therefore. Thompson's 
claim for vagueness must fail. 
POINT II 
THOMPSON'S CLAIM FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
IS UNFOUNDED 
When considering ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Utah courts consistently 
apply the test articulated by the United States Supreme in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). 
Under Strickland, a defendant raising an ineffectiveness claim must show '"first, that his 
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment and, second, that counsel's 
performance prejudiced the defendant.'" State v. Kelley, 2000 UT, f 25, IP.3d 546 quoting 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). 
To prevail, Thompson "must identify specific acts or omissions that fell outside the wide 
range of professional assistance and illustrate that, absent those acts or omissions, there is a 
'reasonable probability' of a more favorable result.'" State v. Simmons, 2000 UT App. 190, ^ 4, 5 
P.3d 1228. 
Thompson's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is premised on the failure of 
counsel to make contact with him other then just before trial, on lack of investigation of the 
information Thompson shared with counsel regarding Thayer's mental health, and on counsel's 
failure to impeach Thayer. 
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First, whether or not trial counsel failed to keep in contact with Thompson before trial 
does not have any effect on the facts of the case. Thompson called Thayer numerous times over 
an hour. Thayer asked Thompson to stop calling. Thompson continued calling Thayer, and was 
frightening her. This behavior is in violation of Utah Code Ann. 76-9-201. There is no reasonable 
probability that the acts of trial counsel would have changed the outcome of Thompson cs guilty 
verdict. 
Second, Thompson's claims of inadequate investigation are without merit. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that "if counsel does not adequately investigate the underlying facts of 
the case, including the availability of prospective defense witnesses, counsel's performance 
cannot fall within the wide range of professional assistance . . ." State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810 
(UT App. 1994) quoting State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 ( UT 1990). 
The information given by Thompson to counsel regarding Thayer's mental welfare was 
not an underlying fact in this case. The testimony by investigating Officer Michael Bastian was 
that Thompson called Thayer to find out if Thayer loved him and to see his daughter. There is no 
mention that Thompson was concerned for Thayer's mental welfare. Furthermore, Officer 
Michael Bastian testified that when he asked Thompson why he had been calling so frequently 
Thompson stated he wanted to know if Thayer loved him and wanted to see his daughter. (Tr. at 
14). Also, Officer Bastian testified that there was no mention by Thompson that he was 
concerned about his former wife's health or mental state. (Tr. at 29-30). The lack of counsel's 
investigation into Thayer's past mental state did not have any prejudicial impact on the verdict in 
this case. 
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Third, Thompson fails to show how counsel"s failure to impeach Thayer's testimony 
prejudiced him or would have changed the outcome of the verdict in favor of Thompson. 
Whether Thayer called Thompson on the day in question was something that she could not 
remember.(Tr. at 10). Thayer testified that she called Thompson at some point in time to see if he 
wanted to come- visit his daughter Madison. (Tr. at 10) and (Tr. at 27). Thayer's call to 
Thompson does not dispel the facts that Thompson made numerous phone calls to Thayer, that 
Thayer asked him to quit calling, and that his repeated calls frightened her. Thayer asked 
Thompson to stop calling her. Nevertheless, Thompson continued to call Thayer. Thompson's 
conduct is in direct violation of Utah's telephone harassment statute. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
The subsection of Utah's former telephone harassment statute that defendant was found 
guilty of was not found to be unconstitutional by this Court in Provo City v. Whatcott. The 
amended telephone harassment statute contains language identical to that which Thompson was 
found guilty of violating. 
Thompson's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit. Thompson fails 
to show how any acts or omissions of trial counsel would have any prejudicial impact of the 
verdict in this case. Accordingly, Provo City respectfully requests this court to affirm the District 
Court's conviction of Thompson for telephone harassment. 
DATED this iZ- day of July, 2001. 
VERNON "RICKMtQMNEY 
Counsel for Appealed 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereb\ certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellee to Dana M Facemyer, 3507 North University, Suite #150, Jamestown Square, 
Hanover Bldg., Provo, Utah 84604 this n~ day of July 2001. 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-9-201 (amended 2001). 
LEGISLATIVE GENERAL COUNSEL S.B. 141 
<L Approved for Filing: SCA <L 
& 01-22-01 9:38 AM & 
1 TELEPHONE HARASSMENT AMENDMENTS 
2 2001 GENERAL SESSION 
3 STATE OF UTAH 
4 Sponsor: Terry R. Spencer 
5 This act modifies the Criminal Code by deleting language regarding the offense of telephone 
6 harassment that has been found unconstitutional by the Utah Supreme Court 
7 This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 1953 as follows: 
8 AMENDS: 
9 76-9-201, as last amended by Chapter 28, Laws of Utah 1996 
10 Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
11 Section 1. Section 76-9-201 is amended to read: 
12 76-9-201. Telephone harassment 
13 (1) A person is guilty of telephone harassment and subject to prosecution in the 
14 jurisdiction where the telephone call originated or was received if with intent to annoy, alarm 
15 [another], intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, harass, or frighten [any person] another at the called 
16 number [or recklessly creating a risk thereof], the person: 
17 [(a) makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues;] 
18 [(b)] (a) makes repeated telephone calls, whether or not a conversation ensues, or after 
19 having been told not to call back, causes the telephone of another to ring repeatedly or 
20 continuously; 
21 [(e)] £b} makes a telephone call and insults, taunts, or challenges the recipient of the 
22 telephone call or any person at the called number in a manner likely to provoke a violent or 
23 disorderly response; 
24 § [l(d)| (c) makes a telephone call and uses any lewd or profane language or suggests any 
25 lewd or lascivious act;] § or 
26 [(c)] § [ftftl (cj § makes a telephone call and threatens to inflict injury, physical harm, or damage 
27 to any person or the property of any person. 
- 1 - Senate Committee Amendments 1-31-2001 rd/sca 
S.B. 141 01-22-01 9:38 AM 
28 (2) Telephone harassment is a class B misdemeanor. 
Legislative Review Note 
as of 1-11-01 1:53 PM 
A limited legal review of this legislation raises no obvious constitutional or statutory concerns. 
Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel 
- 2 -
